How the Meiji Restoration Bought In Elites Through Minimal Change

Works in Progress wants someone to write this article:

How the Meiji Restoration bought in elites. Japanese samurai did not just accede to the total destruction of their way of life and status in society, but actively fought for it. How did the architects of the Meiji Restoration convince samurai to accept change?

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The Meiji Restoration’s genius wasn’t convincing Japan’s elites to accept revolutionary change—it was discovering a path that barely required change at all. Despite its reputation as a dramatic economic transformation, the Meiji “Restoration”’s political transformation was precisely that: a restoration that maximized the preservation of existing power structures while satisfying foreign demands just enough to avoid colonization.

The architects of Meiji Japan didn’t begin with a grand revolutionary plan. Instead, they iteratively tested the minimal changes needed to appease foreign powers while keeping domestic elites content. The imperial court retained its traditional ultimate authority—which it had always possessed, even under the Tokugawa. Wealthy merchants kept their economic dominance and state-supported advantages, but gained new mobility and freedoms. Elite samurai transferred their positions from Tokugawa bureaucracy to imperial service, often in identical roles, while gaining new opportunities in business and local leadership. Farmers and artisans saw their daily lives barely change, except for the welcome removal of legal restrictions on movement and occupation. Even the shogun, the one elite with the most to lose, was bought in diplomatically, only resorting to military action after he himself became the most revolutionary element in Japan. Japan’s unique advantage was having a perfectly clear, conservative objective that all elites shared: expelling foreign influence and restoring traditional independence. This conservative goal made conservative strategy not just politically wise but logically optimal.

By framing minimal institutional changes as necessary steps toward this universally desired outcome, the Meiji leaders avoided the resistance that more revolutionary failed proposals triggered. This wasn’t luck—the Meiji leaders systematically followed what Axelrod’s game theory principles show are optimal strategies for coalition-building. They were clear in their messaging about goals, nice in minimizing change while maximizing invitation to the new system across classes, appropriately retaliatory with their new military when cooperation failed, and forgiving by accepting former enemies into the new government. The shogun’s downfall came from violating these principles at almost every turn, even centuries earlier! The lesson for modern political change: you don’t need revolutionary change to support radical progress. You need optimal game theory. Aim to be as inclusive, iterative, and gradual as possible while establishing credible threat of violence if necessary, and you will succeed at doing what Meiji did: a true restoration, carrying forward the best of the past onto the path of progress.

But why did this work in Japan and not, say, China?

WHY: Objectives

Japan’s objectives aligned with their status quo.

China’s objectives went against their status quo.

Japan had inertia of being independent (Sakoku “closed country” since 1600s), whereas China had a habit of being a rich global trading partner. This probably was the main difference as the path of pursuing global relations with a wider, richer, more powerful world necessitated so many structural adaptations. China set itself a much harder goal than Japan’s.

HOW: Strategy

Japan’s elites were able to experiment and learn what worked.

China’s elites were paralyzed by their own creations.

Japan’s existing elite structure allowed new government to try everything in a learning iterative loop. China, though having the same underlying NeoConfucian ideas about social structure, had added a centralized government where Japan had maintained a decentralized federation of over 200 semi-independent domains. China’s centralization built a rigidity which stifled learning, whereas Japan’s decentralization enabled and accelerated it.

WHEN: Timing

Japan had a massive luck advantage from an overdetermined foreign policy environment.

China was unlucky in having to learn many lessons the hard way.

Both Japan and their Western Imperial counterpart, USA, had learned the twin lessons that both resistance and subjugation were less preferable outcomes than economic cooperation. Britain, France, China had to learn these the hard way after many false steps which took a while (if ever!) to recover.

Why was it Japan and USA second and not first?

Japan was seen as “2nd prize” to China’s “1st Prize” because it was bigger and already trading (see WHY: Objectives above).

USA already had a lesson in the problems of colonization by being a former British colony. USA had just finished its domestic westward expansion, and Japan was actually the next landmass available at the time!