The Meiji Restoration teaches a powerful lesson for modern political change: true success doesn’t come from radical revolutionary ideals but from understanding what existing elites actually value. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration succeeded by strategically co-opting existing inertia and building coalitions, rather than demanding a total rupture from the past.

The term “restoration” was more than just propaganda—it was a psychologically astute strategy. Meiji leaders understood that the relevant elites were concentrated within and without the samurai class, and they leveraged this insight. They knew that for most samurai, losing meager stipends was a financial wash, especially when paired with debt forgiveness. More importantly, they preserved what samurai truly valued: their identity as faithful servants, by reframing the change as a restoration of imperial loyalty. Meanwhile, merchant elites gained new mobility while maintaining familiar relationships with the government.

This approach offers a crucial counterpoint to historical failures like the instability of the first French and Bolshevik Revolutions, WWI’s punitive approach to Germany, and modern political movements like Brexit and MAGA, which demonstrate the enduring power of appealing to inertia. The Meiji model suggests that being inclusive, iterative, and forgiving allows the best elements of the past to be carried forward onto a path of radical progress.

Preview of Examples

  • True Restoration, Not Revolution: Former enemies were systematically integrated, and the Shogun ceded power diplomatically. The Shogunate’s long-standing grudge against “outside” domains like Satsuma and Choshu ultimately came back to haunt them, as these excluded groups became the core of the Restoration.
  • Minimal Actual Resistance: The total population involved in “uprisings” was a tiny fraction of Japan’s 30 million people, and even of the 2 million samurai. The few so-called ‘rebellions’ that occurred were often internal disagreements rather than opposition to the new government itself.
  • Elite Preservation in Practice: The new kazoku nobility included former daimyo and upper samurai in similar roles. Samurai stipend elimination came with debt forgiveness, creating a financial wash for many. Even sword-wearing was protected until being gradually phased out years later.
  • Masterclass in Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Theory: Axelrod’s principles of game theory (be clear, cooperate initially, retaliate appropriately, and forgive defectors) are on full display. The winning government adhered to these, whereas failures including the Shogun, violated them.
  • Government subsidies by another name: https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jrbh1984/3/0/3_0_135/_pdf/-char/en Mitsui Zaibatsu